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Abstract 
This paper proposes a ‘constitutional’ alternative to the current conflict between Palestinians and 
Israelis. Through an engagement with a particular branch of liberal political theory – Richard 
Flathman’s ‘wilful liberalism’ – the paper proposes how strengthening legislatures rather than relying 
on judiciaries is central to the conflict. This proposal seeks to ensure that the nature of equality is 
protected in the region by encouraging citizens to be more actively engaged in their political lives 
through the creation of robust legislatures. Rather than seek to reinforce the existing legislative 
structures alone, however, the paper proposes how a transnational legislative structure might not only 
protect and empower individuals it might also help to lessen the conflict in the region. The paper is 
largely one of constitutional theory rather than empirical detail, though by setting out this alternative, 
it hopes to contribute to those seeking alternatives to the currently stalemated conflict. 
Keywords 
Wilful liberalism; legislatures; equality; constitutionalism; transnationalism. 
 
 1 
Introduction* 
This paper argues that attaining a form of liberal equality in the Palestinian-Israeli context requires 
stronger legislative institutions. Admittedly, the current functioning of legislatures in either political 
context does not suggest that such institutional reform will accomplish this objective. Over the course 
of the argument, however, I seek to make a theoretical case for the importance of legislatures and then 
use that case to intervene into the Palestinian-Israeli context. In so doing, I do not presume that this 
will resolve the many overlapping issues surrounding this conflict; rather, this is an effort at ‘out of the 
box thinking’ with a particular focus on constitutionalism as a possible avenue for such thinking 
(Mossberg 2010; Grinberg 2010). In terms of constitutionalism, then, rather than rely on a judiciary to 
discover the rights of individuals by arriving at the ‘right’ answer through constitutional deliberation, 
this paper will propose how the design and implementation of legislative institutions provides a means 
by which individuals can claim and enforce their own equality. The argument develops a theory of 
liberalism that emphasizes the centrality of political agency.  
Legislatures tend to be the least popular of governmental institutions. The inability of the US 
legislature to pass a budget in 2013, caused in part by ideological politics within the US House of 
Representatives, reminds us why. They are sites of political posturing, self-interested behaviours, 
special interest pleading, and political compromise that lay bare the hypocrisy associated with so much 
of modern politics. Yet, as Jeremy Waldron reminds us, legislatures are crucial to successful liberal 
politics. They are the location of vigorous deliberative democracy. They are the space in which 
disagreement can be addressed non-violently. They provide fora in which executives can be held 
accountable. They provide citizens with the means to legislate, which allows them to exercise their 
public reason in ways that advance their interests and the larger democratic project (Waldron 1999; 
Waldron 2006).  
The paper will also briefly compare the practices of the Knesset and Palestinian Legislative 
Council in terms of how they protect and promote equality through their institutional structures 
concerning representation, law making and political party formation. The paper will propose that if 
there is to be a “two state-solution” to the conflict, these two institutions might be revised in some 
ways, but will also suggest that a more important innovation would be a transnational legislative body. 
This proposal could function in a federal and/or supranational context; its design is not intended to 
predetermine the larger political context. Drawing insights from the European Parliament and the 
devolved British constitutional structure, and keeping in mind the centrality of equality and 
citizenship, the paper will argue that such an institution would allow for the continuation of certain 
political identities in the contexts of Israel and Palestine, but would also ensure multiple forms of 
representation that can further protect and help cultivate active citizenship in the region.  
The paper proceeds as follows: The first section uses Ronald Dworkin’s defence of equality in 
liberal constitutionalism as the clearest argument for its importance and how it can be achieved by 
judiciaries ensuring the protection of rights. While Dworkin’s understanding of liberal equality 
provides an excellent starting point, I suggest that it leaves the individual unable to ensure his or her 
equality through an active form of political practice. Partly as a supplement to, and partly in opposition 
to Dworkin’s account, I turn to a different form of liberalism, that of Richard Flathman, whose ‘wilful’ 
liberalism proposes that the liberal tradition should promote a kind of deep scepticism about theories 
that seek normative agreement, due in large part because of the ways in which language and identity 
create profound differences among human persons. Comparing Flathman and Dworkin, I suggest that 
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there are points at which they agree, but that Flathman’s account turns us away from Dworkin’s 
largely judicial focused conception of constitutionalism.  
I then turn to the centrality of the legislature in ensuring the kind of liberalism that Flathman 
proposes (though he himself was sceptical of most institutional solutions to political problems). I look 
to the work of Immanuel Kant via Jeremy Waldron to argue for the importance of legislating as central 
to liberal constitutionalism. Kant argued that to be a person using reason is paralleled by the act of a 
community making law. Legislatures do more than just make laws such as limiting the power of the 
executive. In this paper, however, I focus primarily on the act of law-making, which draws from both 
Kant’s emphasis on the law of reason and Flathman’s emphasis on the idea of self-making. Finally, I 
briefly review the Palestinian and Israeli legislatures, the former stunted by the ongoing conflict, the 
latter facing threats from an encroaching judiciary and executive, and suggest that both need to 
reassert their roles as the central elements in their respective political orders. But, I conclude that 
perhaps through a transnational legislature will there be a new phase in the conflict. I briefly propose 
how a transnational legislative body might both help bring together warring sides and also, more 
importantly, constitute equal citizens in this conflict ridden region.  
The approach undertaken in this paper is that of International Political Theory which draws on the 
methods and traditions of political theory to speak to a wider range of issues and problems in the 
global order. While I argue for a form of liberalism in this paper, it is a liberalism that develops 
through an appreciation of the contested nature of liberalism itself. The analysis in this paper draws 
less on Middle East comparative politics and more on constitutional theory, which can be applied to 
the region (Brown 2002, Lang 2013, Thompson 2013). The proposal, especially of the transnational 
legislature, is admittedly not something to be achieved any time soon. Rather, it is an effort to work 
out the possibility of an alternative framework for how equality might be achieved in the context of 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
Dworkin on Equality 
Ronald Dworkin calls equality the ‘sovereign virtue’ (Dworkin 2000). His masterful defence of a form 
of liberal equality sets the stage for the issues to follow, though as will become evident soon enough, it 
has its limits. Dworkin begins by arguing that equality cannot be of ‘welfare’ but must be of 
‘resources’. By this, he means that because of the complexity of what it means to be a human being, 
due to diversity in lifestyles and taste, we cannot frame a political order such that it seeks to promote 
equality of welfare. Rather, because we can come up with some means of comparing access to 
resources and their benefits to our lives, we should establish a political order that seeks to promote 
some level of equality in this realm rather than in more open ended realms such as happiness. Dworkin 
argues that this basic idea underlies John Rawls’ famous original position, the heuristic device by 
which individuals design a political society without knowledge of their own abilities in such a way 
that any limits on their liberty will be to advance the equality of those least privileged. As Dworkin 
notes, the decision to privilege this least advantaged group results from the existence of a moral 
foundation for the principle of equality of resources (Dworkin 2000: 119). 
To achieve this equality, however, Dworkin does not look to the legislature due to his long 
standing defence of judicial review as the most important element of a liberal and democratic political 
order. His preference for the judiciary results in part from his very early defence of rights as trumps 
against which all other principles in a liberal society must be measured (Dworkin 2013 [1977]). In the 
book under consideration here, he argues that representative democracy, while of course central to the 
protection and advancement of equality, must take into account the importance of making what he 
calls ‘accurate’ decisions concerning political outcomes (Dworkin 2000: 204). Accuracy, he admits, 
assumes that there are right answers to moral questions, which would be connected in some ways to 
his defence of rights. 
Constructing Equal and Vigorous Citizens. The Role of Legislative Politics 
3 
While rights can and do provide a way to achieve equality, there are other means by which equality 
can be achieved. Instead of an alternative, the argument made here should be seen as a supplementary 
means by which equality can be attained in liberal politics: an invigorated form of agency. By agency, 
I am making a claim similar to Aristotle’s idea of citizenship, which is the virtue of being able to rule 
and be ruled. Agency means cultivating a kind of disposition in citizens that will encourage them to be 
involved in political life, to participate in public political events, and to stay informed about politics. 
This political agency and engagement should not come at the expense of citizens’ personal interests 
but must somehow connect their interests to those of the community. Again, Aristotle is helpful here 
in his idea of phronesis, or prudence, which means being able to make judgments that are not 
completely self-oriented but include a healthy respect for and promotion of one’s own personal 
interest. Hannah Arendt also privileges agency, in part through a dialogue with Aristotle and others in 
the Greek tradition. Her account highlights the centrality to political life of active engagements in the 
political sphere by which individuals reveal themselves and work toward the construction of a shared 
political space within which such activities can continue to take place (Arendt 1958). 
Dworkin’s liberalism, then, is one of not simply rights but of right answers. This kind of liberalism 
is admittedly a powerful corrective to certain accounts of majoritarian theories of politics in which 
rights can be overridden by the majority. Dworkin and others believe that judiciaries with the power of 
constitutional review can partly address this problem. There is an interesting analogue to Dworkin’s 
account in the way that certain Middle East countries enact review by a different kind of court, one 
that derives its authority from sacred scriptures or clerics. Iran is the primary example of such an 
institutional framework. The Guardian Council, established in the wake of the Iranian revolution of 
1979, seeks to ensure that all legislation is in accordance with sharia, or Islamic law. While this is not 
a court in Dworkin’s sense, it is nevertheless a court of sorts. It seeks to find the ‘right’ answers to 
constitutional and political questions. Admittedly, the court structure in Iran is complicated, and its 
constitutional heritage is the result of historical Shi’ite jurisprudence. But what the Guardian Council 
demonstrates is that when such an appeals structure is established in order to advance a particular set 
of normative ideas or values, it will undoubtedly overstep its boundaries and become a power centre 
that advances its interests or a distorted version of its own morality. This is not a critique of the 
particular form of jurisprudence employed by this political system, i.e., Islamic; rather, it is a wider 
critique of how an appeal to ‘right’ answers undermines political process and deliberative democracy. 
As Said Arjomand demonstrates, the Guardian Council has undermined any role for a judicial 
structure that might protect the rights of individuals (Arjomand 2013). Additionally, especially 
because of its non-liberal role of approving candidates who can run for parliament, the Majles, the 
Iranian parliament, has been threatened not only by the executive in Iran but by the Guardian Council 
as well (Fahri 2013). The Guardian Council might be seen as an extreme version of Dworkin’s idea, 
one that relies on a particular reading of Islamic law in the pursuit of ideological purity, or simply in 
an attempt to find the ‘right answers’.  
So, in the pursuit of rights that are central to liberalism, a judicial approach may lead to problems 
by failing to give agency to individuals, especially if that agency relies on and derives from a kind of 
deliberative democratic structure. The danger of leaving constitutional protections to a court might be 
seen as particularly dangerous in the Middle East, where efforts to find ‘right’ answers can lead to 
powerful interests overriding individual agency. Before moving on to how a legislature might counter 
this, let me suggest an alternative to Dworkin’s particular underlying liberal philosophy, through a 
different kind of liberalism. 
Flathman on Liberalism 
Richard E. Flathman proposes what he calls a ‘voluntarist’ conception of liberalism. In other places, 
he calls this liberalism wilful or agonistic. It is, ultimately about the ability of individuals to make 
themselves by engaging in political action. Flathman undertakes this task through an engagement with 
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thinkers as diverse as Hannah Arendt, Ludwig Wittenstein, William James, and Thomas Hobbes 
(Flathman 1992, Flathman, 1994, and Flathman 1998).  
Voluntarism relies on the importance of voluntary action, which Flathman argues is central to any 
liberal tradition that is true to its focus on liberty. Voluntary actions are those that we choose 
ourselves, are not coerced, and that result from ‘desires and interests, beliefs, values and reasons that 
are in some sense the individual’s own… Understood as an ideal for human life, its emphasis is always 
first and foremost on the often-wonderful character of human conduct (notwithstanding its frequent 
vulgarity, ugliness, immorality, and the like), on the ways in which the inexplicable diversity of our 
thinking and acting should be celebrated by us’ (Flathman 1992: 9-10). 
Flathman finds this voluntarism expressed most clearly in the political theory of Thomas Hobbes. 
This is surprising, at first glance, because Hobbes is so often presented as a theorist of absolutism, 
sometimes posed against the liberalism of John Locke. But Hobbes is certainly a liberal theorist, one 
who begins from many of the same epistemological and metaphysical premises as Locke. Their 
divergence, of course, centres on the ability of individuals to resist government if it violates the 
contract established among the people, which Hobbes does not find acceptable in the same way. This 
dimension of Hobbes’ thought, however, is not central to the argument being made here. What is 
important is the centrality of ‘self-making’ that exists in Hobbes’ political theory. Flathman traces this 
idea through Hobbes’ scientific and philosophical ideas, but focuses in particular on how Hobbes 
viewed language as something that is used by individuals to make themselves and the world around 
them. This self-making extends, of course, to such things as the Leviathan, the state that provides the 
means for individuals to continue their acts of self-making by providing a form of order and structure.  
For all of Hobbes’ talk about the absolute authority and fear-inspiring power of the Sovereign, his 
Leviathan is and on this premises can only be a paper tiger, is and must be incapable of cogently 
demanding or effectively compelling more than minimal obedience from its subjects. His Leviathan 
could not begin to impose the order and control he wanted. (Flathman 1994: 7) 
Flathman uses other thinkers than Hobbes to make his points, but his reading of Hobbes is so 
provocative that it is useful to emphasize. A key element of this reading is that Hobbes recognizes the 
diversity of human existence and especially the diversity of human thought patterns. Both Hobbes and 
Flathman are sceptical of efforts to convince us to change our minds through a deliberative process 
(Tuck 2002: 215). Indeed, it is only through individual self-making that we are truly human. For 
Flathman, this means that liberal institutionalism is problematic, especially when it verges toward 
efforts to create rules or the rule of law that will ensure individual citizens conform to standard values 
and/or norms in order to create a peaceful society (Flathman 1998: 79-104). The title of one of 
Flathman’s books captures this sentiment – Reflections of a Would-Be Anarchist (Flathman 1998). 
Flathman argues that institutions that arise in a liberal state often verge toward communitarian value 
based efforts to create uniformity of belief and action in ways that prevent equal and engaged citizens 
from working together to create their political order. Though it might echo such ideas, Flathman 
differentiates himself from libertarian thought,  such as is found in the  work of Friedrich Hayek and 
other neoliberals. Rather, he presents his account as being sceptical of any ‘arrangement or rule, 
principle or person’ having the authority to establish what is right and good for all (Flathman 1998: 
xvi). This differs from his earlier work on authority in which he argued that for authority to function, it 
requires some broad acceptance of what he calls ‘authoritative values’ (Flathman 1980).  
This last point from Flathman is important for the Middle East. Too often, there are efforts to 
describe Middle East politics as not simply being authoritarian but actually needing a kind of 
authoritarianism to deal with conflicting ethnic and religious frameworks. Indeed, a Hobbesian 
Leviathan, in the common sense understanding of that word, seems to be just what not only political 
actors but scholars writing about places as diverse as Egypt, Syria, and perhaps even Palestine seek to 
promote as necessary for governing the conflicting and violent polities they govern and study. But, in 
Flathman’s reading of Hobbes, the authority of the Leviathan depends on individual people being 
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active, equal citizens who can evaluate and assent to a government rather than quiescent individuals 
forced to conform to a particular ideology or value system. That is, rather than being based on the 
power of the sovereign to define right and wrong, good and bad, (and God and Satan), Flathman’s 
Hobbes provides a framework in which there need to be active, vigorous citizens who constitute the 
Leviathan that governs them. When polities appeal to the wisdom of leaders, their connection with 
ideological frameworks, or even divine conceptualizations of how the world ought to function in order 
to justify their mode of governance, it is precisely the sceptical political liberalism of Flathman that 
can help disabuse us of those notions.  
Flathman does not develop an account of institutions in his liberalism, for he is wary of their power 
to overwhelm political life and prevent individuals from engaging in continual acts of self-making 
(Flathman 1998). Here I differ from Flathman in that I see a crucial role for institutions in which 
individuals can turn their energies into a long term set of institutions that can frame their political 
lives. In my view, the one institution that is the most important for constructing the means by which 
liberal self-making can flourish is the legislature. The act of law-making is the kind of action that 
Flathman finds in Hobbes and which he celebrates throughout his work; that is, I think that the act of 
law-making can be part of the wilful liberalism that Flathman seeks to promote. The following section 
makes this case through an engagement with the work of Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Waldron.  
Kant (and Waldron) on Legislation 
Legislation is not the same thing as law, for legislation is the act of making law by an assembly, 
usually a representative one such as a parliament. Moreover, legislation is often looked down upon in 
legal theory, a point from which Jeremy Waldron has recently made a vigorous dissent. In his Seeley 
Lectures, entitled The Dignity of Legislation, Waldron begins by noting that in many works on legal 
theory, particularly from the broad Anglo-American positivist tradition, the only good law comes from 
judicial bodies. The image of the wise judge deliberating about how to interpret a constitution is 
preferred to the self-interested and unpredictable antics of legislative bodies (Waldron 1999). In 
response to this preference for law making through judicial review, Waldron seeks to valorise the 
legislative body, not by turning to the utilitarian traditions of Bentham and Austin, but to theorists 
usually associated with the protection of rights, Locke and Kant, and a theorist noted for his focus on 
virtue and community life, Aristotle. Through an engagement with each philosopher, he develops a 
nuanced and powerful defence of the legislative branch and, importantly, the act of legislation as a 
crucial element in the practice of democratic and liberal governance. The core of his argument is that 
legislation and legislative bodies provide the space within which interests can be reconciled not by 
eliminating differences but by giving legislators and representatives the opportunity to understand and 
engage each other through a long term deliberative practice. In so doing, legislation creates a kind of 
public political action that is at the heart of liberal and republican political theory, which is at the core 
of constitutionalism. This is not to deny that other agents of government have crucial roles, both the 
executive and the judiciary. Rather, the point is that the legislature provides a space for more active 
engagement from citizens in ways that executive and judicial bodies do not.  
Building on one aspect of Waldron’s account, let me briefly turn to Immanuel Kant, who is 
considered one of the most important philosophers within the liberal tradition. Kant is a theorist of 
liberalism who is perhaps closer to Dworkin, especially in his belief that there is a ‘right answer’ that 
can be found through the correct exercise of reason. I do think, however, that some elements of Kant’s 
conception of legislation can link up with Flathman’s liberalism, especially in the centrality of the 
public use of reason to make law. 
Before turning to his theory of legislation, however, it is important to highlight two elements of his 
thought. The first and most essential part of not only Kant’s political philosophy but his moral 
philosophy is freedom, an idea he develops in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 
2002 [1785]). The moral law is something we know through reason. He believed that the proper use of 
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the faculty of reason would allow the person to understand the necessity of morally correct behaviour. 
Connected to reason is the will and it is through the use of our reason that the will’s role in moral life 
can be understood. The will is central to Kant’s moral philosophy, for morality only makes sense if we 
are able to act through a will that has not been coerced. Indeed, to understand this point does not 
require fully assimilating Kant’s philosophy, for it is a rather common sense idea. If I am to be judged 
as acting rightly or wrongly, it is necessary that my actions be seen as emanating freely from 
something internal to me. If my actions can be explained away as the result of some force over which I 
have no control, whether it be God or nature, then it is difficult to see how I might be responsible for 
my own actions. For Kant, this internal element by which I can be judged to have acted morally or not 
is the will. 
The will, however, should not be understood here as simply my desires. In fact, for Kant, a good 
will is one that acts in accordance with duty rather than desire (Reiss 1991: 18). This results from the 
fact that I live in community with others and for me to act in a way that allows me and others to have 
the same freedom means my actions must be constrained. This constraint, again, is not from an 
external authority. Because we live with others, our internal freedom must correspond to our external 
freedom. This external freedom means acting in accordance with the rule of law. So, to be truly free in 
Kant’s philosophy does not mean doing what we desire, but acting so that our wills conform to our 
duty which creates a world of law abiding individuals. 
The second principle of Kant’s political philosophy is publicity. This means that politics should not 
be hidden from the citizenry in the name of some mythical national interest or security. For Kant, this 
is connected to his idea of enlightenment, which is in the background of much of his political writing. 
In his famous essay, ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’ Kant links publicity to 
freedom (Kant 1991 [1784]). To be enlightened, for Kant, means that one’s public use of reason is not 
subject to restrictive or paternalistic authority, especially governments and churches in Kant’s day. For 
us today, that might mean thinking about matters in such a way as we are not influenced by the media, 
friends, or family. That is, for Kant, to be enlightened means to ‘think for oneself’. But it also means 
that we must be able to think in public, something he describes in the following: 
For enlightenment … all that is needed is freedom. And the freedom in question is the most 
innocuous form of all – freedom to make public use of one’s reasons in all matters…. The public 
use of man’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men; 
the private use of reason may quite often be very narrowly restricted, however, without undue 
hindrance to the progress of enlightenment. But by the public use one’s own reason I mean that 
use which anyone may make of it as a man of learning addressing the entire reading public. What 
I term the private use of reason is that which a person may make of it in a particular civil post or 
office with which he is entrusted. Kant 1991 [1784]: 55 
Kant is arguing that freedom is the most important foundation for enlightenment, but it should be 
freedom that is made use of in public. The ‘public’ space here is somewhat confusing, though. As 
Elisabeth Ellis has argued, this space is one which does not involve one’s roles in civil society; so, for 
instance, a member of the clergy is acting in ‘private’ when he or she makes official statements about 
church doctrine, but is acting in the public sphere when he or she is stating how those doctrines relate 
to public life shared among citizens in a community (Ellis 2005: 20). Ellis develops this idea of 
publicity in Kant further, arguing that it provides us with an idea of civil society in which individuals 
can make their voices heard in an intelligent manner, one which will help the society and humanity 
overall evolve toward greater peace, justice and harmony.
1
  
The third idea that requires some clarification is Kant’s conception of law and legislation. Kant’s 
political theory is very much a republican one, or one that emphasizes the creation of political space 
                                                     
1
 Waldron finds the same principle of publicity central to Hobbes’ work. In an essay he wrote in response to Flathman’s 
account of Hobbes, Waldron claims that the publicity of the law is what Hobbes believes is necessary for individuals to 
ascent to it. See Waldron 2002.  
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that allows for the maximum amount of liberty with a balance for political order. Importantly, this 
means it is not only about ensuring rights for citizens, but ensuring that the state is organized such that 
no single agent within the state can dominate it, or what we would call the separation of powers. 
Kant’s political system establishes such a separation, although not in the full sense in which this 
concept is understood today. Kant lays out this idea in the first part of his work, The Metaphysics of 
Morals (Kant 1991 [1797]). This work is composed of two parts, the first focused on right and the 
second focused on virtue. This first section is sometimes referred to by its German name, Rechtslehre, 
which means something like the ‘science of right’. Note that this is not about ‘rights’ in the sense of 
human rights as we understand them. Rather, this section of Kant’s work is about the idea of right as 
an organizing principle of politics, specifically how to structure the political system so that everyone’s 
freedom can be respected, or as Kant puts it: ‘Right is therefore the sum total of those conditions 
within which the will of one person can be reconciled with the will of another in accordance with the 
universal law of freedom’ (Ibid.: 133). 
In this work, Kant separates the three institutions of governance analogously to the way in which 
individuals act. The legislator is like the operation of reason, the executive like the will, and the judge 
is like the actual outcome of the decision making process in specific cases (Ibid. 138).  
Moreover, and importantly for this paper, the legislative power is the most important one in Kant’s 
conception, in the same way that reason is the most important faculty in the human person. This 
legislative power constitutes the sovereignty of the people, for it is through participating in the 
legislative process that people unite into the general will. As Kant states, ‘The legislative power can 
belong only to the united will of the people’ (ibid. 139). Further, it is in so acting as the legislative 
power that the people become citizens: ‘The members of such a society (societas civilis) or state who 
unite for the purpose of legislating are known as citizens (cives)…’ (ibid.). The power of legislation, 
then, is not simply about creating good laws; it is the fundamental element of political life for the 
ordinary human person. Of course, this does not mean that all people are directly part of the legislating 
process, for this happens through various configurations such as parliaments. But, it is important to 
note that Kant distinguishes this legislative action from other kinds of rules, such as regulations, by the 
fact that it comes from a unified will of the people. When the executive makes commands, these are 
not instances of law but of ordinances or regulations. When the executive seeks to make laws, this is 
when government becomes despotic (ibid. 141), for it conflates the role of the sovereign (reason) with 
that of the agent who enacts the law (will).  
Waldron helpfully finds in Kant, then, a strong defence of the legislature, not just of law. That is, 
rather than a defence of the rule of law, this account makes a defence of law making one that links up 
to a defence of liberal agency, the importance of making the human person one who can defend him or 
herself through an engagement in the public realm. This account reflects Flathman’s emphasis on the 
self-making at the heart of his liberalism, though, as noted above, Flathman is wary of over-
institutionalizing political life. The legislature is a place where the liberalism of self-making and active 
citizenship can reinforce the basic equality of all persons. This differs from Dworkin’s account, which 
looks to the judge and a foundational conception of rights to ensure equality. Of course, rights are 
central to how equality is defended in many realms, but it is also important to note that individuals can 
make themselves in many ways through their active engagement in political life, which the account so 
far suggests can best happen in legislative bodies. 
Palestinian and Israeli Legislatures 
To what extent do the legislatures of the Palestinians and Israelis live up to the model of a legislature 
that enables liberal political agency? First consider the Palestinian context. There exist two 
parliamentary structures for Palestinians, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) and the Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC). As described on the Palestinian observer mission to the UN website, ‘The 
PNC, which is the highest decision-making body of the PLO, is considered to be the parliament of all 
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Palestinians inside and outside of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem.’
2
 The PNC 
meets in various places, including the Palestinian Territories, and has over 600 members. The PNC 
currently resides in Amman, Jordan, where it continues to meet.  
When the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, however, a process of institution building began 
within the Palestinian Territories which included the creation of the Palestinian Legislative Council 
(PLC). Officially, PLC delegates are members of the PNC, which gives the PNC the ultimate 
authority. When it was created, however, the PLC was a new institution for Palestinians; it was the 
first time that a parliamentary structure with law making powers had been created in Palestine itself 
(Brown 2003: 94-137). Elections were held in January 1996 and 88 delegates met for the first time in 
March 1996. Under the terms of the Oslo Accords, the PLC is not a sovereign parliament, though its 
design and activities belie this point. The majority party in the initial stages was Fatah, which 
dominated the institutions and political positions following the Accords. The parliament was as 
representative as it could be under the conditions imposed by the Accords and the ongoing conflict 
with Israel (Brown 2003).  
For many, the PLC has been seen as a failure, for it has not constrained the executive, even in its 
initial phases, and since 2009 it has failed to be a significant presence in Palestinian politics (Abu-
Amar 1997). While its continuing role is under question, especially in light of the split between the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Hilal 2010), it might, in a small way at least, be interpreted as 
undertaking the type of law-making that I proposed as central to the wilful liberalism articulated 
above, particularly through its law making practices. First, its law making practices were more 
inclusive of the Palestinian population than the PNC had ever been (and more effective, in that was 
based in the territory and had competencies concerning domestic life). For instance, in its efforts to 
create a ‘Basic Law’, roughly the equivalent of a constitution, the PLC underwent a more inclusive 
process of law making.  
Drafts were publicly circulated, PLC members attended public workshops and town meetings, and 
the technical help offered by the PLO’s Legal Committee and the Ministry of Justice’s Diwan al-
fawa wa-l-tasrhi gradually faded in importance in the process (though it retained its role in 
ordinary legislation). Other laws followed a similar path: the NGO Law was drafted initially in 
Palestinian ministries but then, when taken up by the PLC, came to resemble much more closely 
drafts produced by NGOs themselves. Professional associations participated in drafting laws that 
governed their own affairs… [B]y its very procedures-in which draft laws underwent an initial 
reading before the entire PLC-it became easy for affected groups to track relevant legislation, and 
PLC members and committees regularly consulted affected groups. Brown 2003: 126  
Brown highlights a second crucial feature of the PLC, that its law making efforts reflected a less 
securitized and more broadly understood liberal approach to political life. The PLC worked with 
international NGOs and parliamentarians around the world in seeking advice on the laws it sought to 
pass. But because they came to their position with different concerns than the largely revolutionary 
members or the executive, who had learned their political practices from other Arab governments 
where parliaments were (and are) rather weak, the PLC members initiated legislation that sought to 
advance a more inclusive political structure within Palestine, from a revised version of political party 
laws to the Basic Law itself. 
Again, there has not been much success since the early days of the PLC, and it failed to constrain 
the executive which continues to dominate the system. The results of the 2006 elections in which 
Hamas won the majority but then were not recognized by the executive authority of the Palestinians, 
and when many members were arrested, effectively immobilized the PLC (Hilal 2010: 29). My only 
point here is to highlight that when the PLC was working it seemed to embody a kind of liberalism 
that might have contributed to something different in the Palestinian context, a more engaged and 
active citizenry playing a role in making laws to govern it.  
                                                     
2
 See http://www.un.int/wcm/content/site/palestine/pid/12345.  
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Turning to the Knesset, there is, of course, a more robust parliamentary institution in place, one 
designed to be the dominant institutional structure at the founding of Israel in 1948 (Mahler 2004: 
141). The ‘Westminster model’ in which the executive comes out of the parliament obviously gives 
great power to the legislature as the primary entity in the system. Additionally, the lack of a written 
constitution that would allow the judiciary a strong role in the system makes Israel’s political order a 
prime candidate for the kind of liberalism described here.  
But the Israeli political system has evolved in two directions that undermined the power of the 
legislature. First, in 1992, a law was passed that allowed for the direct election of the prime minister 
rather than having him selected by the President as a result of his or her party winning the majority in 
the Knesset. This law was reversed in 2001, but it nevertheless strengthened the power of the 
executive at the expense of the legislature. When the Israeli political system switched to a system in 
which the prime minister and party elections were separated,  this may have contributed to an increase 
in identity politics focused on ethnicity and religious belief. The logic here, according to Myron 
Aronoff, is that because the prime minister is elected on the basis of a wider national interest concern 
(as with the US president), parliamentary elections focused instead on more localized interests 
(Aronoff 2000: 102). Such a focus would undermine the kind of self-making that Flathman proposes, 
and which I believe is best manifest in a powerful legislature, in that identity politics do not lead to the 
kind of interactive self-making that a political community requires. Rather, one can see it as a kind of 
anti-liberal self-making that generates conflict and dissent in a political community particularly 
through its exclusionary practices as opposed to a more pluralistic ideal. While this law has been 
reversed, one might argue that the larger ‘Americanization’ of Israeli politics that led to this change, 
and can be seen in the politics of Benyamin Netanyahu, continues to undermine a more vigorous 
political system in Israel. Indeed, the 2013 elections in Israel seemed to reinforce the focus on the 
personalization of politics, as parties put forward individuals as central to their platforms rather than 
ideas (Yiftachel 2013: 56).  
The second change was a more active Supreme Court, and the creation of a constitutional like text 
through the activist court of Aharon Barak. Barak’s efforts have been welcomed by many, as he has 
argued that judicial review is central to the creation of a democratic system in which equality and 
rights are paramount (Barak 2012). There is not enough space in this paper to explore this change in 
full depth, but it is important to highlight its role in constructing a kind of liberalism. Many see 
Barak’s efforts as the embodiment of the Dworkinian approach to liberal democracy. And, indeed, 
Barak’s efforts are to be welcomed on many fronts in making Israel a stronger, more rights based 
political system. At the same time, it is unlikely that this move might create a more vigorous citizenry 
engaged in the kind of political self-making that Flathman, and I, think are central to both liberalism 
and the promotion of equality.  
The Knesset, despite these changes, remains a powerful institution with Israeli politics. It is also a 
model of democratic governance in many ways, and its robust and vigorous political debate, coalition 
politics, and efforts to advance democracy and equality in Israel do map on to many of elements of the 
liberalism I articulated above. At the same time, shifts in its politics to more identity based party 
structures and the creation of a more powerful Supreme Court may undermine these changes to some 
extent. Interestingly, the 2011 emergence of tent cities and protests throughout Israel in which Israeli 
citizens, many young, sought to advance a more equal and just distribution of resources and political 
power, did not emerge from the Knesset and, in some ways, arose in response to perceived inequalities 
arising from entrenched political interests and political parties. But even more importantly for the 
purposes of this paper, Israeli politics has moved away from accommodation with the Palestinians to a 
more aggressive effort to side-line their interests and agendas. If there is to be equality across the two 
communities, perhaps a different legislative structure is necessary.  
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An Alternative Legislature 
The following brief remarks on the Palestinian and Israeli legislatures suggest that in both cases, the 
legislature can serve as an institution in which wilful liberalism might be able to flourish and enhance 
political equality. But in both cases, the existence of the other community has confounded the ability 
to truly advance such equality across the two. Is it possible, then, that a more inclusive transnational 
legislature might help remedy this? 
There have existed and still exist models of legislatures that cross the boundaries of any single 
community. Reviewing some of these is helpful in establishing what an alternative legislative model 
might look like in this context. Colonialism, while by definition a relation of inequality, did see the 
emergence of law making practices that included individuals from different communities. For 
instance, Great Britain developed something called the ‘legislative council’ which sought to create 
legislative bodies that included representatives from the colonial centre and the colony. These 
institutions created laws that reflected the interests of both the colonizer and the colonized. Of course, 
such institutions reflected the power dynamics of colonialism, and are not ones that should necessarily 
be the model here. More importantly, by creating implicit inequalities, these institutions failed to allow 
for the advancement of political equality. Nevertheless, they suggest that law making can occur in a 
diversity of contexts (Wight 1946, Lang 2013b).  
From the Middle East, the transition of the Ottoman Empire toward more constitutional reforms in 
the 19
th
 century Tanzimat movement provides evidence of another alternative form. More germane to 
this paper, these reform efforts also contributed to the political activism of individuals throughout the 
empire. For instance, the peasant revolts of the mid-19
th
 century Lebanon reflect the emergence of 
political activism on the part of those who had long been side lined from political life by the feudal 
structure of their societies. The efforts of Tanyus Shahin, a local Maronite peasant leader from 
Lebanon to increase the role of the previously marginalized community in the representative councils 
that made law in the Ottoman Empire demonstrates the ways in which a greater political activism 
developed during this era. Admittedly, this was more of a demand for greater representation, but this 
kind of demand is what could be the foundation for a transnational legislative structure. As described 
in Elizabeth Thompson’s recent work on constitutionalism in the Middle East region, this activism led 
to the creation of a more actively engaged legislative politics in the Ottoman context (Thompson 2013: 
37-60). Certainly, the Ottoman Empire’s law-making structures did not conform to the liberal model 
of political agency described above, nor did the institutions that emerged from the Tanzimat reforms 
last very long. Yet, the important point is that it was through participating in law-making institutional 
structures that activists like Shahin sought to advance their equality by engaging in political action.  
Today the most developed model of a transnational legislature is the European Parliament, which 
engages in law-making, in collaboration with other institutions within the European Union. Another 
model not transnational, but pluralist, might be the British devolved parliamentary system, in which 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all have parliaments and yet there remains a central parliament 
in Westminster governing the country as a whole in certain areas (though depending on the results of a 
referendum in Scotland in 2014, this model may revert to the more traditional one). Another model is 
the federal system of the United States in which state legislatures govern in some areas and the US 
Congress governs in other ways. These federal systems are not transnational, of course, but they 
provide some foundation for considering how such a model might work. Recently, Jean Cohen has 
argued for just such models as a way to think about a global governance system, one that is not a 
global constitutional order, but moves in that direction (Cohen 2013). 
But there is no need to adhere to any one of these particular models. Indeed, the complexities of the 
Palestinian-Israeli context suggest that none of these would be the right fit. This is not a proposal for a 
one-state solution, but rather a proposal for a governing structure in which both Israelis and 
Palestinians would be active, elected members and which would govern particular areas of concern to 
both communities. Individuals elected to such a body might be distinct from or drawn from the 
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respective legislative bodies of both communities. It would undermine the executive dominance that is 
to be found more prominently in the Palestinian context and yet is increasing in the Israeli context. It 
would force the parties to engage with each other more directly and, if its deliberations were opened to 
the wider community, could active a more inclusive political life in which individuals across the 
political spectrum engage with each other.  
How might such an institution function? The following four institutional design suggestions 
provide a starting point. First, such an institution would have two chambers to it, one directly elected 
throughout the entirety of the region and a second chamber elected from the two existing parliaments. 
This model would then allow for the continuation of the two states in some format but would 
encourage law-making by individuals from across the two political societies. Even more creatively, 
one might envision a role for the PNC as representative of Palestinians who remain outside of the 
boundaries of the territory. To introduce this, however, might also require how Jews living outside of 
Israel might be represented. Such a model is not anathema to liberal politics; France has long had 
representatives from outside of the territory of France who are elected to represent the interests of 
those living abroad. To design these electoral rules would require a great deal of work and political 
bargaining, for they go to the heart of the conflict in many ways; the right of return, for example, 
would be translated into a right of representation.  
Second, the transnational institution would be vested with law making competency in a very 
limited sense to begin with, which might expand as the political process develops. This could mean 
something like a United Nations General Assembly or the pre-Maastricht European Parliament, an 
institution that cannot make law in a formal sense but expresses the ‘sense’ of the international 
community. A slightly more developed form of law making might be competencies in relation to 
limited issues that cross boundaries, such as developing administrative models for employment, social 
welfare, or boundary crossings. These more regulatory rules, while not fully ‘legislation’ in the 
Kantian sense described above, could be a starting point for allowing the political actors in these two 
societies interacting with each other.  
Third, with any legislature in the modern liberal world comes the development of political parties. 
Party identification is one of the methods of self-making, yet it can also be extremely exclusionary and 
counteractive to a pluralist liberal ethos. For this reason, political parties should be allowed to form 
organically, but with the proviso that they include individuals from both communities. This would 
apply only to the lower house, for the upper house, arising from representatives from the already 
existing legislative bodies, would reflect existing political configurations. But, perhaps a rule could be 
put in place that would require those coming from existing political parties to somehow identify within 
a formal way the political parties that arise from the lower chamber’s electoral politics. In so doing, 
only parties that encourage a kind of ‘internal’ pluralism would be able to run candidates for elections.  
Fourth, the division of a territory into concrete structures from which representatives are elected is 
often one of the most contested parts of legislative politics. But alternatives certainly exist in the 
region; the Lebanese effort to include both sectarian and regional identities has resulted in shifting 
electoral laws throughout its turbulent political history (Baaklini, Denouex and Springborg 1999: 79-
110). For the lower house of this transitional legislature, individuals would come from territorially 
demarcated districts, while the upper house, deriving as it does from the legislatures of the two 
communities and perhaps from institutions outside of the territories, more space would be allowed for 
different forms of identity. Certainly, the complexity of the currently existing identities of individuals, 
including Palestinian citizens of Israel, would make this difficult to achieve in practice. I cannot 
resolve these problems here, only point to them as ones that need to be considered. One related effort 
to deal with these issues, and which proposes a reconfigured territorial arrangements comes from Lev 
Ginsberg. His proposal for seven new territorial divisions suggests that creative efforts to rethink 
current territorial arrangements are possible (Ginsberg 2010). 
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These four principles are suggestions that might provide a means to advance the politics of liberal 
self-making. Legislative bodies can serve as institutional spaces within which political rights and 
equality can be vigorously defended and advanced. Alongside of this narrower mode of political 
activism, they can also advance what one theorist calls an ‘enlarged mentality’ (Nedelsky 2006). 
When political agents need to both advance their own interests and the interests of those they 
represent, but most also work with others to achieve the objective of passing legislation in whatever 
form, they are forced to see the politics of the other in a much more concrete and specific manner. 
Such an enlarged mentality also encourages respect for others and recognition of them as truly human 
and deserving of equality. A transnational legislative body is one way in which a constitutional 
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might advance some form of equality, diversity, and perhaps 
even peace and justice.  
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